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The issue of invocations' at public school graduations involves the inter-
section of two competing strands of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Graduation prayer is a traditional, ceremonial practice that takes place in the
special context of the public schools. While the Supreme Court has tended to
treat traditional practices with great deference, it has applied the Establishment
Clause with an almost reciprocal rigor in public school cases.
The Court has frequently indicated that official references to God and other
governmental acknowledgments of the nation's "religious heritage" are permis-
sible.2 The validity of these practices, which blend religion and patriotism, the
theological with the political, rests on their historical, ubiquitous nature.3 In
particular, the Court has sanctioned the use of invocations at government-
sponsored events, including legislative invocations in Marsh v. Chambers.4
Graduation prayer differs from these valid invocations only in setting.
The public school, however, is a unique setting:
[It] is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive
means for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of the State
is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools, to avoid
confusing, not to say fusing, what the Constitution sought to keep
strictly apart.5
1. Phrases such as "invocations" and "graduation prayer" will be used throughout this Note to refer
to invocations and benedictions collectively.
2. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); id. at 714 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (public
"acknowledgment" of religion "inevitable"). For examples of valid practices, see id. at 676 (designation
of Thanksgiving and Christmas as national holidays); id. at 677 (statute authorizing proclamation of National
Day of Prayer); id. at 716 (national motto "In God We Trust" and pledge of allegiance); School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1963) (oaths); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962) (national
anthem); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday-closing laws).
3. See. e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630-31 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
4. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The invocation proclaimed at the opening of each court session ("God save
the United States and this honorable Court") is clearly valid. See. e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. at 213; Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,313 (1952). Members of the Court have also sanctioned the practice of including
an invocation in presidential inauguration ceremonies. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 671 n.9 (Kennedy,
3., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
5. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.).
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The Court has therefore reviewed religious practices in the public schools with
greater scrutiny. 6 The application of apparently different standards of review
has led to the seemingly anomalous result that a practice may be invalid in the
public schools yet permissible in other spheres of public life.7
The Supreme Court will address graduation invocations for the first time
this Term.8 Three circuit courts have recently considered this issue.9 These
courts have adopted differing categorical approaches, viewing graduation prayer
in terms of either traditional practices or the public school cases. Part I of this
Note maintains that despite their split over the relevant line of precedents, all
three courts join in impermissibly focusing on the content of the invocations.
Part II argues that the Court's most recent school prayer decision, Board of
Education v. Mergens,10 suggests a different approach to graduation invoca-
tions. Part III argues that graduation prayer should be evaluated in terms of
Mergens. Under this analysis, invocations, if given on an equal access basis,
should be permissible.
I. THE SPLIT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
The courts of appeals disagree on whether traditional practices or the public
school cases should control the issue of graduation prayer. This split mirrors
a more fundamental division on the Supreme Court regarding the Establishment
Clause itself. The "Lemon test"'" continues to command a majority of the
6. "The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause
in elementary and secondary schools." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987). With two
exceptions, the Court has struck down every public school practice challenged on Establishment Clause
grounds. See id. (statute requiring teaching of "creation science" if evolution taught); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38 (1985) (statute providing moment of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer"); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (statute requiring posting of Ten Commandments in classroom);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (statutory ban on teaching of evolution); Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(teacher-led student recitation of prayers and reading of Bible verses selected by state); Engel, 370 U.S.
421 (teacher-led student recitation of state-composed prayer); McCollum, 333 U.S. 203 (release-time program
involving religious instruction on school grounds). The two exceptions are separated by nearly 40 years.
See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990) (extracurricular student religious clubs permitted
same privileges as nonreligious clubs); Zorach, 343 U.S. 306 (upholding release-time program for religious
instruction off school grounds).
7. Compare Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677 (government proclamation of National Day of Prayer permissible)
with Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 40 (statute authorizing moment of silence for "meditation or voluntary prayer"
in classroom impermissibly endorses prayer).
8. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991).
9. Weisman, 908 F.2d 1090; Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1090 (1989); Stein v. Plainwell Community Schs., 822 F2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
10. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
11. Under Lemon, a practice must satisfy each of the test's three prongs: "First, the statute must have
a secular purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' Lemon




Court in the form of the "endorsement test."12 The endorsement test clarifies
Lemon by asking not whether state action "advances" religion, but whether the
practice "conveys a message" that the state "endorses" religion through the
practice.' 3 Like Lemon, the endorsement test draws its most important ele-
ments directly from one of the Court's first public school cases. 4
Justice Kennedy argues that traditional practices such as the legislative
invocations approved in Marsh v. Chambers,5 not the public school cases,
should provide the foundation for Establishment Clause analysis: "Whatever
test we choose to apply must permit not only legitimate practices two centuries
old but also any other practices with no greater potential for an establishment
of religion."' 6 A consistent application of the endorsement test, he asserts,
would invalidate many of these practices,'17 since "government speech about
religion is per se suspect" under this standard." Justice Kennedy has therefore
proposed a new test based on "coercion." This test would permit the state to
"endorse" religion, but would prohibit "actions that further the interests of
religion through the coercive power of govermnent."' 9
Graduation invocations have been reviewed by the First Circuit in Weisman
v. Lee 2° and by the Sixth Circuit in Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools.
21
12. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592-93 (1989); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 593 (1987); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389-90 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
60 (1985).
13. Justice O'Connor proposed the endorsement test as a "clarification" of Lemon. Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668,687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Under this approach, the purpose prong "asks whether
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether,
irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval." Id. at 690.
14. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) ("The test may be stated as follows: what
are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment?").
15. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). In Marsh, the Court upheld the widespread practice of beginning legislative
sessions with an invocation delivered by a legislative chaplain. The Court did not apply the Lemon test in
the case. Instead, the Court emphasized the practice's "unambiguous and unbroken history of more than
200 years." Id. at 792. The Court indicated that the first Congress passed a law providing for the payment
of legislative chaplains just three days before it approved the final language of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 788.
The Court took this as compelling evidence that the drafters of the Establishment Clause did not intend to
bar legislative invocations. Id. at 790.
16. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
17. Id.; see also Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[I]f the Court were to judge
legislative prayer through the unsentimental eye of our settled [Lemon] doctrine, it would have to strike it
down as a clear violation of the Establishment Clause.").
18. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
19. Id. at 660.
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or
callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact "establishes
a [state] religion or religious faith or tends to do so."
Id. at 659 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)); see also Board of Educ. v. Mergens,
110 S. Ct. 2356, 2377 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
20. 908 F.2d 1090 (lstCir.), aff'g 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991).
The majority opinion of the appellate court simply affirmed the lower court's decision, stating: "ve are
in agreement with the sound and pellucid opinion of the district court and see no reason to elaborate
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The Eleventh Circuit considered the analogous practice of invocations before
high school football games in Jager v. Douglas County School District.' The
Stein court analyzed the case in terms of Marsh v. Chambers,z3 arguing that
graduation invocations, despite their public school setting, should be considered
under the same standards as legislative invocations. The Stein court held that
Marsh permits "nonsectarian" graduation prayers.' For the Jager and
Weisman courts, however, the public school setting was decisive. Asserting that
Marsh's approval of the same practice in a different context was irrelevant,
these courts treated graduation like "every other school day"' and reviewed
the invocations under the Lemon test.2 6 They held that all prayers at public
school events violate the Establishment Clause.
In Engel v. Vitale27 and School District v. Schempp the Court held that
schools may not authorize student recitation of prayers either composed or
selected by the state. The Engel Court declared that "each separate government
in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official
prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and
to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance."29 In Marsh,
Justice Brennan in dissent argued that Engel and Schempp "hang over this
[case] like a reproachful set of parents." 30 Given Stein's reliance on Marsh,
it is not surprising that the court's sanction of nonsectarian graduation prayer
appears plainly inconsistent with Engel. What is perhaps surprising is that the
holdings in Jager and Weisman, cases decisively rejecting Marsh in favor of
the Court's public school cases, are equally contrary to Engel's dictates.
further." Id. For this reason, this Note will focus on the district court's opinion. References to the "Weisman
court" will be to this opinion.
21. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987). Two additional cases have been decided more recently. Jones v.
Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991) (invocations valid), petition for cert.filed, 60
U.S.L.W. 3215 (U.S. Aug. 20, 1991) (No. 91-310); Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809
(Cal. 1991) (invocations invalid), petition for cert.filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3316 (U.S. Sept. 20, 1991) (No. 91-
477). In addition, the Second Circuit has upheld graduation invocations in dictum. Brandon v. Board of
Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) ("IW]here a clergyman briefly appears at a yearly high school
graduation ceremony, no image of official state approval [of religion] is created."), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1123 (1981).
22. 862 F.2d 824 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989).
23. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
24. 822 F.2d at 1409.
25. Weisman, 728 F. Supp. at 74; see also Jager, 862 F.2d at 829 & n.9.
26. While the two courts referred to the endorsement test, their opinions seem to have been guided
by the traditional Lemon analysis. See Jager, 862 F.2d at 829, 831; Weisman, 728 F. Supp. at 72-74.
27. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
28. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
29. Engel, 370 U.S. at 435.
30. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 806 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Engel, 370 U.S. at 425 ("lit is no part
of the business of government to compose official prayersfor any group of the American people to recite
as a part of a religious program carried on by government." (emphasis added)). But see Schempp, 374 U.S.
at 213 (sanctioning legislative invocations in dictum).
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A. Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools
In Stein,31 two students challenged the inclusion of invocations in gradua-
tion ceremonies at two public high schools. 32 Student volunteers gave the
invocation and benediction at one school. At the other school, a Lutheran
minister selected by students gave the invocation and benediction. No school
officials at either school were involved in selecting speakers or in composing
invocations. 3
The Stein court held that Marsh v. Chambers34 governed the case because
graduation invocations are more analogous to judicial and legislative invoca-
tions than to the practices reviewed in the school prayer cases. The court argued
that it would not be "consistent" to ban graduation invocations "while sanction-
ing the tradition of invocations for judges, legislators and public officials. '35
The Stein court read Marsh as sanctioning "nonsectarian" invocations in any
public setting.3' Applying this standard, the court struck down the challenged
invocations because they "employ[ed] the language of Christian theology and
prayer.'37 This sectarian language violated the Establishment Clause because
it "'symbolically place[d] the government's 0 seal of approval on one religious
view'-the Christian view. '3
The Stein court held that Marsh permits only nonsectarian invocations.
While the court offered no explicit definition of "nonsectarian," its opinion
provides guidelines for the composition of appropriate invocations. The court
invalidated the prayers at issue because they contained references to "Christ"
and "Jesus. ' 39 The court was silent, however, on other religious references
in the prayers, such as "Heavenly Father," "Lord," and "Divine Master"; I
these words were apparently sufficiently nonsectarian. The court's citation of
certain phrases and omission of others thus conveys an outline for constitution-
ally acceptable graduation prayer.
The Stein court's holding is in direct conflict with Engel v. Vitale.41
Stein's sanction and necessary definition of "nonsectarian" prayer plainly
violates Engel's mandate that government "stay out of the business of writing
31. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
32. Id. at 1407.
33. Id. at 1407 & n.2.
34. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
35. 822 F.2d at 1409.
36. Id. This reading of Marsh has been criticized by both judges and commentators. See infra note
42.
37. 822 F.2d at 1410.
38. Id. (second alteration made, but not indicated, in original) (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792).
39. 822 F.2d at 1407 n.2, 1410.
40. See id. at 1407 nn.1-2.
41. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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or sanctioning official prayers."" In addition, Stein requires school officials
to assume control over the composition of invocations in order to ensure
"nonsectarian" content. School composition of prayers seems clearly invalid
under Engel.43 The only possible reconciliation of Stein and Engel places
schools in a strange position: students may offer state-composed prayers at
graduation, but may not recite them during the school day.' Such a reconcilia-
tion might preserve Engel's particular holding, but it clearly eviscerates the
decision's rationale.
42. 370 U.S. at 435; see also Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68,75 (D.R.L) ("Neither the legislative,
nor the executive, nor the judicial branch may define acceptable prayer."), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (Ist Cir.
1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991); Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of
Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1661 (1989) (Stein "strikes at the heart of religious liberty").
Judge Wellford in dissent and several commentators have argued that these problems arise from the
court's misreading of Marsh. The Stein court examined the content of the prayers because it interpreted
Marsh to permit only nonsectarian prayers. These critics maintain that Marsh permits both sectarian and
nonsectarian prayers; an inquiry into content is unnecessary and therefore improper. See Stein, 822 F.2d
at 1412 (Wellford, J., dissenting); Adams & Emmerich, supra, at 1661 (Stein court "probably misread the
Marsh opinion regarding judicial examination of the content of prayers"); James J. Dean, Comment,
Ceremonial Invocations at Public High School Events and the Establishment Clause, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1001, 1014-15 (1989). They rely on this passage in Marsh:
The content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication that
the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any
other, faith or belief. That being so, it is not for us to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to
parse the content of a particular prayer.
463 U.S. at 794-95.
There is, however, a certain element of circularity in the Marsh Court's statement. The Court states
that judges should not examine the content of prayers "where ... there is no indication that the prayer
opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one.., faith or belief." But how is a judge
to determine whether a"prayer opportunity" has been so "exploited" without reviewing the prayer's content?
It would seem, then, that the Stein court was correct to read Marsh as sanctioning only nonsectarian prayers
and, by implication, judicial review of particular invocations. The Court itself has read Marsh in this manner.
See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989).
43. See also School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down analogous practice of school
selection, rather than composition, of religious exercises).
44. On remand, the district court, perhaps recognizing this inconsistency, held that the school must
satisfy both Marsh and the Lemon test. The court held that the prayers must be nonsectarian yet not advance
a religious viewpoint. The court further directed the school to control the invocations' content while avoiding
excessive entanglement with religion. See Theresa M. Serra, Note, Invocations and Benedictions-Is the
Supreme Court "Graduating" to a Marsh Analysis?, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 769, 788-89 (1988) (citing Stein
v. Plainwell Community Schs., No. K85-197 CA4 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 1988)). This holding, however,
removes the school from an anomalous position and places it in an impossible one, for official composition
of prayers is a classic form of "excessive entanglement." See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 798-99
& n.8 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (government monitoring of content of invocations is "excessive
entanglement" with religion); Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1095 (lst Cir. 1990) (Bownes, J., concurring)
(school's control over content is excessive entanglement), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991); Dean, supra
note 42, at 1029. But see Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416, 423 (5th Cir. 1991) (school's
control over content not excessive entanglement), petition for cert.filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3215 (U.S. Aug. 20,
1991) (No. 91-3 10).
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B. Jager v. Douglas County School District and Weisman v. Lee
The courts in Jager v. Douglas County School District45 and Weisman v.
Lee46 rejected the Stein court's Marsh approach and examined invocations in
terms of the Court's public school cases. Under this standard, "consistency"
required the prohibition of all graduation prayer. As the Weisman court held,
"If students cannot be led in prayer on all of those other [school] days, prayer
on graduation day is also inappropriate under the doctrine currently embraced
by the Supreme Court."'47
The Jager court reviewed the tradition of invocations before high school
football games. In response to a student's complaints about prayers offered by
ministers before games, the school adopted an equal access invocation plan,
The plan neither prohibited nor required religious invocations. It specified that
invocation speakers would be chosen at random by the student government.
Students, parents, and school staff members were eligible to give invocations;
ministers were not. The school was to have no role in selecting speakers or in
composing invocations. The plan, however, was never put into effect 9 As
a result, the Jager court, unlike the Stein court, had no actual invocations before
it.
The Jager court rejected Stein's Marsh approach in favor of the Lemon
test.50 The court held that the invocation plan had the impermissible purpose
and effect of endorsing religion, for it "permit[ted] religious invocations, which
by definition serve religious purposes, just like all public prayers."51 The court
struck down a plan permitting "religious invocations" and "prayers" because
the Establishment Clause allows only "secular invocations" and "inspirational
speeches."52
Jager's prohibition of prayer eliminates the need for courts to separate
"sectarian" from "nonsectarian" references within prayers. But the court's
position does not remove the necessity for judicial inquiry into the content of
prayers. In order to decide whether particular invocations are valid under Jager,
courts must determine whether they are "religious" or "secular"; stating that
all "prayers" are invalid does not define "prayer." Because there were no
particular invocations before the court, Jager prudently refrained from offering
45. 862 F.2d 824 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989).
46. 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I.), affid, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305
(1991).
47. 728 F. Supp. at 74.
48. 862 F.2d at 827.
49. The district court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the school district from implement-
ing the plan. See id.
50. Id. at 828-29 & n.9.
51. Id. at 830.
52. Id.
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any guidelines. Weisman v. Lee5 3 however, confirms the necessity and diffi-
culty of defining the religious and the secular once a court holds that all
"prayers" are invalid.
In Weisman, a student challenged the Providence School Department's
policy of including invocations and benedictions in high school and middle
school graduations.54 In contrast to the invocations in Stein and Jager, the
challenged invocation was given at a middle school graduation. Also unlike
Stein and Jager 5 school officials selected the speaker and provided both
formal guidelines and verbal instructions regarding the content of the invoca-
tion.56
The Weisman court agreed with the Jager court that Marsh57 had no
application in a public school setting." It followed Jager in treating school
events such as graduation like "every other school day."5 9 The court struck
down the invocation and benediction under the Lemon test, holding that they
had the impermissible effect of "endorsing" and "advancing religion."'6o The
invocations were invalid because they "creat[ed] an identification of school with
a deity, and therefore religion. '61 The court explicitly rejected Stein's sanction
of nonsectarian prayer and joined Jager in taking a categorical stance: "Here,
it is not the particular nature or wording of the prayers which implicates the
first amendment-it is prayer at the ceremony which transgresses the Establish-
ment Clause."62
The Weisman court held that all prayers were invalid, regardless of their
content. The court, however, could determine whether the challenged invocation
53. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I.), affd, 908 F.2d 1090 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert. granted, Ill
S. Ct. 1305 (1991).
54. Id. at 69.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 33, 49.
56. Two teachers chose Rabbi Leslie Gutterman to give the invocation and benediction. Rabbi
Gutterman was given a pamphlet entitled "Guidelines for Civic Occasions" and was told by the school
principal that "any prayers delivered at the ceremonies should be non-sectarian." See Weisman, 728 F. Supp.
at 69.
57. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
58. Weisman, 728 F. Supp. at 74.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 73.
61. Id. at 72. Rabbi Gutterman's invocation read:
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave:
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of minorities are
protected, we thank You. May these young men and women grow up to enrich it.
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow up to guard it.
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate, for its court
system where all can seek justice we thank You. May those we honor this morning always turn
to it in trust.
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan Bishop Middle School
so live that they might help to share it.
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are our hope for the
future, be richly fulfilled. Amen.
Id. at 69 n.2.
62. Id. at 74.
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was a prayer only by analyzing its content. This particular invocation was an
invalid prayer "because a deity [wa]s invoked." 63 The court meant this state-
ment to be taken quite literally: if the invocation had not included the word
"God," "the Establishment Clause would not be implicated." 64 The court then
set out an edited version of the invocation as an example of one that "Rabbi
Gutterman could have delivered."'
The Weisman court argued that the Stein court's Marsh approach "results
in courts reviewing the content of prayers to judicially approve what are
acceptable invocations to a deity."66 This approach would necessarily lead to
the "gradual judicial development of what is acceptable public prayer," a
practice the court believed unconstitutional under Engel v. Wtale.67 The court
did not consider its own invocation composition to be inconsistent with this
criticism of Stein, for the court did not understand itself to be composing a
prayer. This belief, however, rested on a presumption that the court was
competent to separate religion from nonreligion, prayers from secular invoca-
tions.
The content of the court's model "secular inspirational message" 68 reveals
that this presumption was clearly unjustified. The court's changes in the prayer
were quite minor. It merely deleted Rabbi Gutterman's title ("God of the Free,
Hope of the Brave"), dropped "Amen," and changed "we thank You" to "we
are thankful."69 The edited invocation retained all of the prayer's thanksgivings
and petitions, phrases which presuppose a being to receive these thanks and
petitions.70 Others could quite reasonably view the court's "secular inspirational
message" as "religious." Indeed, it appears that the court had engaged in the
very activity it sought to prohibit. This perception was confirmed on appeal,
as one member of the First Circuit panel, while agreeing that all "prayers" are
invalid, argued that the court had composed a "prayer. '71
63. Id. at 68.
64. Id. at 74.
65. Id. at 74 n.10; see also supra note 61.
66. 728 F. Supp. at 74.
67. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
68. 728 F. Supp. at 74.
69. Id. at 74 n.10; see also supra note 61.
70. 728 F. Supp. at74 n.10. The courtpreviously noted thatprayer is defined as "'a solemn and humble
approach to Divinity in word or thought usu[ally] involving petition, confession, praise or thanksgiving."'
Id. at 70 n.4 (alteration in original) (quoting WEBSTER's THiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1782
(1981)).
71. See Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1097 (Ist Cir. 1990) (Bownes, J., concurring). Judge Bownes
asserted that the district court's view is "too literal and narrow an interpretation of prayer and of what is
acceptable under the Constitution." Id. He argued that "direct reference to a deity should not be the
constitutional touchstone for our analysis" and that "[a] benediction or invocation offends the First
Amendment even if the words of the invocation or benediction are somehow manipulated so that a deity
is not mentioned." Id.; see also Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F2d 416, 420 (5th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting a proposed "secular" invocation because "[wie do not consider invocations... any more secular
for veiling references to a deity in pronouns and hidden objects"), petition for cert.filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3215
(U.S. Aug. 20, 1991) (No. 91-310).
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C. Judicial Prayer Composition
The Weisman court's invocation composition illuminates the difficulties
posed by Stein and Jager, for it clearly demonstrates what is perhaps implicit
in these decisions. Like the Stein court, the Weisman court separated valid from
invalid invocations by looking for specific words within the invocations. For
Stein, the invalid references were "Christ" and "Jesus"72; for Weisman,
"God."73 In the course of parsing the prayers, both courts provided very
explicit guidelines for composing acceptable invocations. In actually rewriting
the invalid "prayer," the Weisman court merely performed the largely clerical
task the Stein court, equally impermissibly, left to lower courts and school
officials.
Weisman also reveals that the Jager court's "absolutist" approach presents
the same difficulties. As Weisman demonstrates, simply prohibiting all
"prayers" does not remove the necessity for courts to "sit as a board of censors
on individual prayers."'74 While the need to define prayer arises under
Weisman in applying its ban on prayer in particular cases, such a definition is
a necessary part of Jager's initial prohibition. The Jager court struck down a
plan permitting prayer on grounds that schools may not "use religious means
to achieve secular purposes, where, as here, secular means exist to achieve
those purposes."75 The court repeatedly emphasized that the school could
achieve its legitimate secular purposes through "inspirational speeches" and
"secular invocations."76 The court's invalidation of "religious means" thus
depends entirely upon the existence of a clear "secular" alternative capable of
serving the valid purposes advanced by the invalid "religious" practice. Unless
"prayers" and "secular invocations" may be firmly separated such that clear
"secular means exist," Jager provides no basis for invalidating "prayers. 77
72. See 822 F.2d at 1407 n.2, 1410; supra text accompanying note 39.
73. See 728 F. Supp. at 74; supra text accompanying note 64.
74. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 818 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Frank N. White,
Comment, Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools: The Constitutionality of Prayer in Public High School
Commencement Exercises, 22 GA. L. REv. 469, 496 n.96 (1988) (arguing that judicial inquiry into content
of prayers may be avoided by declaring prayer per se invalid).
75. Jager, 862 F.2d at 832 (emphasis added); see also School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 295
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (state may not "use essentially religious means to serve government ends,
where secular means would suffice").
76. The court made this point at least five times in its brief opinion. See 862 F.2d at 829-33.
77. It might be argued that courts could avoid defining "prayer" by either prescribing a moment of
silence or banning invocations altogether. In light of its continual reference to "secular invocations," the
Jager court's silence on these alternatives is telling. A moment of silence might provide a solemn tone for
graduation, but it would not achieve the other valid secular purposes served by invocations. Justice O'Connor
has stated that practices such as invocations "serve the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public
occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy in
society." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O'Connor, I., concurring). It would appear that
invocations, whether "religious" or "secular," are uniquely suited to fulfill these purposes. See supra note
61. Unless a court finds that the secular purposes alleged by the school are merely a pretense, it would seem
that some sort of invocations must be permitted. And once the court permits something to be said, it must
define what may not be said.
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The necessity under Stein to define "nonsectarian" places courts in "a
hopeless theological quagmire."78 Courts are hardy more capable of distin-
guishing prayers and "secular invocations." 79 Since these concepts do not
confofm to a single, "reasonable" view, one might expect, as in Weisman,
several judicial definitions of "religious" and "secular." 0 Stein, which permits
78. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 42, at 1661; see also Marsh, 463 U.S. at 819-21 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (illustrating the impossibility of composing "nonsectarian" prayers).
79. It might appear that judges must examine content if they are to perform their role as interpreters
of the Constitution. As the Court stated in Widmar v. Vincent,
[Tlhe Establishment Clause requires the State to distinguish between "religious" speech-speech,
undertaken or approved by the State, the primary effect of which is to support an establishment
of religion-and "nonreligious" speech-speech, undertaken or approved by the State, the
primary effect of which is not to support an establishment of religion. This distinction is required
by the plain text of the Constitution.
454 U.S. 263, 271 n.9 (1981). Almost immediately after stating this principle, however, the Widmar Court
argued that a ban on "religious speech" might be "impossible" to apply in practice: "Initially, the University
would need to determine which words and activities fall within 'religious worship and religious teaching.'
This alone could prove 'an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs meet the [free
exercise] definition of religion."' Id. at 272 n.II (quoting O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C. Cir.
1979)). Scholars have also suggested that "[flashioning a general definition of religion seems impossible."
Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No
Endorsement" Test, 86 MtcHl. L. REV. 266, 298 (1987) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court has been able largely to
avoid the problem of defining religion in establishment cases. One might wisely hope that this situation will
continue."). See generally George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition
of "Religion." 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983).
There will be cases where judicial "establishment of religion" through an examination of content is
unavoidable. For example, courts must make judgments on the meaning of religious symbols when they
consider challenges to religious displays on public property. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573 (1989). The considerable confusion and disagreement that mark such inquiries, however, do not
commend an extension of this approach to prayer. See infra note 80. Moreover, such a content-based
standard is inconsistent with the special nature of prayer: "The First Amendment was added to the
Constitution to stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal Government would
be used to control, support or influence the kinds of prayers the American people can say." Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421,429 (1962). Following Engel's reasoning, Professor Tushnet argues: "A state-composed prayer
that people are invited to recite is a core violation of the establishment clause, being about as close as one
can imagine to what would have been regarded as a classic establishment of religion [by the Framers]."
Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle ofAccommodation ofReligion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.. 1691, 1712-
13 (1988).
80. The Court recently attempted to distinguish the "religious" and the "secular" in County of
Allegheny. Just as the Jager and Weisman courts held that "religious" invocations were invalid but "secular"
invocations were permissible, the Court in Cotnty ofAllegheny held that "religious" holiday displays were
invalid but "secular" displays were permissible. See 492 U.S. at 615 & n.62. Other Justices criticized this
inquiry into content. Justice Kennedy asserted that "[t]his Court is ill-equipped to sit as a national theology
board, and I question both the wisdom and the constitutionality of its doing so." Id. at 678 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan argued that a search for one
"reasonable view" of religious symbols threatens to "makfe] analysis under the Establishment Clause look
more like an exam in Art 101 than an inquiry into constitutional law." Id. at 643 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissent;ng in part).
An inquiry into the content of prayers or holiday displays, however, presupposes the existence of a
single, "reasonable" viewpoint. The Court compellingly rejected this assumption in West Virginia Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1943): "A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts
into it, and what is one man's comfort and inspiration is another's jest and scorn." The various opinions
in County ofAllegheny reveal the wisdom of this statement. Three Justices, each purporting to give the view
of the "reasonable observer," had three different views of the religious content of a Christmas tree and
menorah. Compare 492 U.S. at 616-17 (Blackmun, J.) (Christmas tree secular symbol) and id. at 633
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (Christmas tree "predominantly secular
symbol") with id. at 639-41 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Christmas tree not
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prayer, and Jager and Weisman, which purport to ban all prayer, are equally
open to the charge that "it is simply beyond the competence of government,
and inconsistent with our conceptions of liberty, for the State to take upon itself
the role of ecclesiastical arbiter."'"
D. The Neglected Question of Endorsement
The difference among the particular holdings in these cases stems from the
different frameworks adopted by each court. The Stein court, viewing gradua-
tion prayer in terms of traditional practices sanctioned by the Court, held that
Marsh permitted nonsectarian prayer. The Jager and Weisman courts claimed
that the invocations' public school setting was most relevant. They held that
the Lemon test prohibited all prayer. On a more fundamental level, however,
the courts' framing of graduation prayer as either a "ceremonial deism" practice
or a public school case led them collectively to ignore the crucial issue in these
cases.
Regardless of which test is used, the Establishment Clause is implicated
only if the challenged religious expression carries the imprimatur of the state.
This principle tends to be obscured in both "ceremonial deism" and school
prayer cases, for there is no question that government endorses the content of
the religious activities. All of the historical practices sanctioned by the Court
are authorized by statute;"2 every public school exercise that has been struck
down by the Court has been organized and led by school officials."s The
speech in each case is literally government speech. Viewing graduation prayer
in terms of these cases, however, renders the private status of the speakers
constitutionally irrelevant. Since all three courts assumed that invocations given
by private individuals necessarily carried the school's imprimatur, the only
secular symbol); compare id. at 613 (Blackmun, J.) (menorah "not exclusively religious" symbol) with id.
at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (menorah "central religious symbol")
and id. at 643 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (menorah "an inherently religious
symbol"). In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens stated that "the presence of the Chanukah menora,
unquestionably a religious symbol, gives religious significance to the Christmas tree." Id. at 654 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 821 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It might appear that Stein adopted the troubling
"role of ecclesiastical arbiter" to a much greater extent than Jager and Weisman. Stein involved explicit
composition of prayers containing explicit religious references. The prayer composition in Weisman was
of a different nature. Because it sought to apply a ban on all prayer, the Weisman court clearly did not intend
to compose one. Moreover, the "prayers" sanctioned in Weisman were less likely to offend, for they
contained no direct references to "God." Weisman, however, in one sense expressly stated what remained
implicit in Stein. In attempting to implement its prohibition of "religious invocations" and "prayers," the
Weisman court held that invocations that do not include the word "God" are neither "prayers" nor
"religious." The holding thus conveys a message of simultaneous "endorsement" and "disapproval" to
persons whose prayers do not include direct references to a deity or whose beliefs do not include a concept
of "God," that is, people likely to be offended by the "nonsectarian" prayers sanctioned by Stein. Under
Weisman, schools may advance these beliefs, but not others, at graduation; the court permits such "endorse-
ment," however, only because it has established that these beliefs are not "religious" at all.
82. See supra cases cited note 2.
83. See supra cases cited note 6.
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question left to ask was whether the invocation itself was religious. Board of
Education v. Mergens,84 the Supreme Court's most recent school prayer deci-
sion, however, reaffirms the importance of this neglected inquiry into endorse-
ment. Instead of seeking to determine if the state has "'symbolically place[d]
the government's official seal of approval on [a] religious view' ,5 by scrutiniz-
ing the "view" for "religious" content, Mergens directs courts to focus on
whether the school has "symbolically place[d] the government's official seal
of approval" on this view in the first place.
Il. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SPEECH
A. Board of Education v. Mergens
In Board of Education v. Mergens,86 the Supreme Court rejected an Estab-
lishment Clause challenge to the Equal Access Act. 7 The Act requires all
public secondary schools with a "limited open forum" to grant student religious
groups "equal access" to the privileges enjoyed by other student clubs.88 The
Mergens Court perceived that Congress intended to extend the principle of
Widmar v. Vincent, 9 a college case, to public high schools and sanctioned this
extension.90
The school argued that its compliance with the Act would have the imper-
missible effect of endorsing religion.91 It contended that "official recognition
of [a religious] club would effectively incorporate religious activities into the
school's official program.., and provide the club with an official platform to
proselytize other students." 92 The presence of religious activities under the
school's aegis would lead students to "perceive official school support for such
[activities]." 93
The plurality acknowledged that some school practices may "creat[e] 'a
84. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
85. See Stein v. Plainwell Community Schs., 822 F.2d 1406, 1409 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Marsh,
463 U.S. at 792).
86. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
87. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988).
88. See id. § 4071(a)-(b). For a more complete account of the Act and its construction by the Court,
see Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2364-70.
89. 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (public universities with "public forum" must give student religious groups
equal access).
90. 110 S. Ct. at 2364. While the decision on the merits was 8-1, there was no majority opinion. Justice
O'Connor's opinion was joined in full by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Blackmun.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the judgment, arguing that "coercion," not"endorse-
ment," should be the Court's Establishment Clause test. 110 S. Ct. at 2377-78. Justice Marshall, joined by
Justice Brennan, also concurred in the judgment. Justice Marshall accepted the endorsement analysis, but
"wrote separately to emphasize the steps [the school] must take to avoid appearing to endorse the Christian
Club's goals." Id. at 2378. Justice Stevens dissented, primarily on statutory grounds. See id. at 2383-93.
91. Id. at 2371.
92. Id. at 2370.
93. Id. at 2371 (citations omitted).
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crucial symbolic link between government and religion.. ."'I The plurality,
however, found the fact that student religious expression was at issue disposi-
tive: "[Tihere is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.""5 Students
would not understand the school to endorse the religious speech of fellow
students because "[t]he proposition that schools do not endorse everything they
fail to censor is not complicated. 96 The opinion contrasted the equal access
plan with practices at issue in the Court's previous school prayer cases. In those
cases, endorsement could be presumed because the activities were officially
authorized, teacher-led exercises. The plurality viewed the equal access plan
as fundamentally different, asserting that "there is little if any risk of official
state endorsement or coercion where no formal classroom activities are involved
and no school officials actively participate.- 97
The plurality stressed the distinction between school and student speech
(and specified that "no formal classroom activities are involved") because
student religious speech would not be confined to the nonclassroom time when
the religious club would hold its meetings. As the Court noted, "equal access"
"carries with it access to the school newspaper, bulletin boards, the public
address system, and the annual Club Fair."98 It was the facilitation of the
efforts of religious students to proselytize other students during school, not the
opportunity for students to pray in private after school, that the school district
and critics of the Equal Access Act emphasized. 99 The ability of religious
clubs to use the public address system ensured, for example, that other students
could frequently hear proselytizing messages along with other announcements.
Critics argued that this broad access for "student evangelists," combined with
the "state's compulsory attendance laws,"" ° meant that each student, "so long
he or she is on the public school premises, may become an unwilling captive
to proselytization." 10 1 Mergens nonetheless held that these "captive" students
would not attribute this religious speech to the school. Citing two cases involv-




98. Id. at 2370.
99. See id. (the school claims that the Act requires it to "provide the club with an official platform
to proselytize other students"); cf. Ruti Teitel, When Separate Is Equal: Why Organized Religious Exercises,
Unlike Chess, Do Not Belong in the Public Schools, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 174, 174-79 (1986) (describing
several instances of proselytizing of "audience gathered by the state" by "student evangelists"). Other
Justices in Mergens also commented on this point. See 110 S. Ct. at 2381 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting
"comprehensiveness of the access afforded by the Act"); id. at 2391-92 & n.22. (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(remarking on interplay between "compulsory attendance laws" and broad access granted to religious
groups).
100. 110S. Ct. at 2371.
101. Teitel, supra note 99, at 183. Teitel cites one such public address announcement of a religious
meeting: "'[The speakers] will talk about what it means to be born again. Come and find out. Bring a friend.
Come and be fulfilled."' Id. at 175.
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ing student expression in the classroom, the plurality stated: "We think that
secondary school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that
a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on
a nondiscriminatory basis.""t 2
B. The Relevance of Mergens to Invocations
Mergens confirms that the content of a challenged activity is irrelevant
unless the court determines that the school endorses the speech. The decision
also reveals that an inquiry into endorsement is more complex than lower courts
might have thought. The Weisman," Stein,"° and Jager'05 courts held
that schools by definition endorse invocations given on school property during
a school event. The Jager court stated this shared assumption most clearly:
"When a religious invocation is given via a sound system controlled by school
principals and the religious invocation occurs at a school-sponsored event at
a school-owned facility, the conclusion is inescapable that the religious invoca-
tion conveys a message that the school endorses the religious invocation." 106
Mergens, however, indicates that even in the setting of a school-sponsored
program, courts should not presume that the speech of private individuals is
endorsed by the school. As the decision itself reveals, it is hardly "inescapable"
that schools endorse religious speech "given via a sound system controlled by
school principals ... at a school-sponsored event at a school-owned facility
.... " In contrast to Jager, the Court in Mergens held that students would not
understand the proselytizing messages given by other students over the public
address system during the school day to carry the endorsement of the
school. 07 While Mergens cannot be read as a blanket validation of all reli-
gious speech in the public schools, it does indicate that such speech is permissi-
ble in the context of programs crafted to avoid conveying a message of en-
dorsement. Guided by Mergens, Part III argues that the practice of graduation
invocations may be structured to avoid the appearance of endorsement and thus
should be permissible.
III. AN EQUAL ACCESS APPROACH TO GRADUATION INVOCATIONS
Courts improperly assume that schools necessarily endorse the content of
the invocations they permit at graduation. Because they deem the invocations
102. 110 S. Ct. at 2372 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
103. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. granted,
111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991).
104. Stein v. Plainwell Community Schs., 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
105. Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989).
106. 862 F.2d at 831; see also Stein, 822 F.2d at 1409-10; IVeisman, 728 F Supp. at 72.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
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to be school speech, these courts must focus on the content of the invocations
in order to determine whether the school endorses religion. This inquiry into
content places the courts in the extremely problematic position of defining and
composing valid invocations. Moreover, this approach, designed to maintain
the appearance of official neutrality, leads schools to convey the message to
both "religious" student speakers and "nonreligious" student listeners that their
beliefs are officially disfavored. Schools must assume control over the content
of the invocations in order to implement the courts' standards. Such school
control means that "religious" speech will be stifled while ensuring that the
edited invocations-which, if the courts' guidelines are followed, will nonethe-
less remain "religious"--bear the school's official stamp of approval.
This Note proposes a different approach: Courts should permit invocations
if they are given by students on an equal access basis without school interfer-
ence. This approach reflects the fundamental principles most recently confirmed
in Mergens and avoids the need for an inquiry into the content of the invoca-
tions. The freedom from school and judicial interference precludes any appear-
ance of official endorsement and permits the invocations to reflect the diversity
of views, both "religious" and "nonreligious," held by students.
This equal access approach rests on Mergens' sanction of a similar practice
in a similar setting. More importantly, it rests on the distinctive focus the
endorsement test lends to the Lemon test, a focus revealed most clearly in
Mergens. Lemon forbids laws that have the "principal or primary effect" of
"advancing" religion. The test thus requires courts to gauge the effects of
government action. In attempting to define this potentially amorphous inquiry,
the Court has stated that "[f]or a law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon,
it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion through
its own activities and influence." ' The endorsement test emphasizes the role
of the state as "speaker." ' 9 Under this standard, the relevant question is not
whether government actions somehow "advance" or benefit religion, but
whether these actions indicate that government "endorses" religion. I" In most
cases, state action that "advances" religion will also "endorse" religion. In some
cases, however, state action may "in fact cause[], even as a primary effect,
advancement or inhibition of religion" and yet be permissible because the state
has not endorsed religion." '' Mergens is arguably one of these cases.
Mergens held that a school may provide students who wish to express
religious views with the same opportunity to speak given other students. At the
same time, the state "provide[s] a ready-made audience for [these] student
108. Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337
(1987).
109. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
110. See id. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111. See id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)).
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evangelists" through compulsory school attendance laws.12 Even though the
state compels students to listen to proselytizing speech, the Court in Mergens
upheld this practice because these students would not understand the school to
endorse the speech. The endorsement test clarifies Lemon's inquiry into the
effects of state action by focusing on whether the state has "spoken about" or
"endorsed" religion. Mergens in turn clarifies this inquiry into endorsement by
stressing that "there is a crucial difference between government speech endors-
ing religion ... and private speech endorsing religion . "... ,, The "'crucial
symbolic link between government and religion' "114 is severed when students
speak, for it is the speech of students, not the "government itself," that "ad-
vances" religion.
An equal access invocation plan permits religious as well as other types
of invocations. At the same time, the pressure to attend graduation, though not
legal, is strong; most students would not think of missing their graduation.
Under Mergens, this plan should be valid if the school can avoid the appearance
of endorsing the invocations. As in Mergens, the Establishment Clause is not
violated under the endorsement test, for while the state might provide a "plat-
form" for student religious speech and compel other students to listen, the state
itself does not speak."5
112. 110S.Ctat2371.
113. Id.
114. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2372 (quoting Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,385 (1985)).
115. The validity of graduation prayer appears more doubtful under Justice Kennedy's "coercion" test.
See supra text accompanying notes 15-19. The difference between the endorsement and coercion tests may
be understood as a disagreement over the aspect of the modem state with which the Establishment Clause
should be most concerned. The endorsement test focuses on the "prestige" of government, or the special
influence government has when it "speaks." This standard bars the state from "advancing" religion by
engaging in practices that "convey[] a message of endorsement or disapproval [of religion]." Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The "coercion" test, in contrast, emphasizes
the "power" of the state. This test prohibits "actions that further the interests of religion through the coercive
power of government." County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Kennedy objects to the endorsement test on two related grounds. First, he argues that the
endorsement test, under which "government speech about religion is per se suspect," is unduly rigid and
inconsistent with the Court's precedents. Id. at 661. Second, Justice Kennedy considers the endorsement
test's searching inquiry into whether the state has "spoken about religion" rather dubious, for the concept
of endorsement "has insufficient content to be dispositive." Mergens, I10 S. Ct. at 2377-78 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Unlike the Mergens plurality (as well as Justices Marshall and Brennan), Justice Kennedy
thought it "inevitable that a public school 'endorses' [the] religious club, in the common-sense use of the
term .... "Id. at 2378.
This emphasis on the "coercion" of individuals rather than on the "speech" of the state is reflected
in Justice Kennedy's treatment of Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The state-composed prayer at issue
in Engel is perhaps the classic example of the "government speech about religion" that the endorsement
testprohibits. Justice Kennedy agrees that "[slpeech may coerce in some circumstances," and he cites Engel
as an "extreme case" where "[s]ymbolic recognition or accommodation of religious faith may violate the
[Establishment] Clause." County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 & n.1. In contrast to the "indirect" coercion
involved in "symbolic recognition," which appears to be a matter of degree, the prohibition of "direct"
coercion seems categorical. For example, Justice Kennedy explains that Engel may also be understood to
forbid "compelling or coercing participation or attendance at a religious activity." 492 U.S. at 660. This
shift from endorsement to coercion no doubt validates many practices where the state speaks but does not
coerce. In County ofAllegheny, for example, the Court held that the government's creche display impermissi-
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Schools may permit "religious" as well as "secular" invocations without
endorsing this speech by creating an "open forum" at graduation containing the
same structural features present in Mergens.it6 The Mergens plurality argued
that students would not understand the school to endorse student religious
speech for the following reasons: (1) the speech was student-initiated; (2)
school officials were not permitted to interfere with "student-led religious
speech" or meetings; (3) the religious club was part of a "broad spectrum of
officially recognized student clubs"; and (4) students had the freedom to
bly endorsed religion. Justice Kennedy, however, argued that the creche was valid, for "[n]o one was
compelled to observe or participate in any religious ceremony or activity." Id. at 664.
But what about those cases where the state coerces but does not speak? This is the situation in Mergens
as well as in graduation prayer. The endorsement test permits these activities because it is possible for the
school to avoid the appearance of endorsing the religious speech. Justice Kennedy, however, focuses on
coercion and believes school endorsement in these cases is "inevitable." If, as his statements in County of
Allegheny suggest, compelling students to "attend" or "observe," as opposed to "participate in," a "religious
activity" is sufficient to invalidate a practice, it is difficult to see how graduation prayer may be permissible.
Most students feel compelled to "attend" graduation, where they will "observe" the unquestionably
"religious activity" of prayer.
Justice Kennedy's most recent statement of the coercion test refers only to coercing "participation."
See Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2377 (Kennedy, J., concurring). At the same time, however, his opinion contains
strong indications that coerced "attendance" may be sufficient to invalidate a practice, either on its own
or because "attendance" itself may constitute "participation." He asserted that the Equal Access Act was
valid because there was no evidence that "enforcement of the statute will result in the coercion of any
student to participate in a religious activity." Id. But his supporting argument seems to go beyond this
statement: "The Act does not authorize school authorities to require, or even to encourage, students to
become members of a religious club or to attend a club's meetings." Id. (emphasis added). The sufficiency
of "attendance," intimated here, was seemingly made explicit soon after. Justice Kennedy explained that
the Act did not violate the rights of school officials because "the Act does not compel any school employee
to participate in, or to attend, a club's meetings or activities." Id. (emphasis added).
If the Establishment Clause bars the state from coercing students to "attend" as well as "participate
in" a religious club's "activities" and "meetings," it is unclear how the Equal Access Act could survive
scrutiny under the coercion test. Students are compelled by state law to "attend" school, and one of the
primary "activities" of religious clubs granted access under the Act appears to be proselytizing other students
during the school day. The school district stressed the potential for daily proselytizing of a "captive
audience" by "student evangelists" under the Act. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102. Justice
Kennedy, however, in contrast to the other Justices who wrote in Mergens, see supra note 99, was curiously
silent on the broad access granted to religious clubs under the Act. This silence might be explained by the
arguably secondary importance of this issue in Mergens. At any rate, graduation prayer provides an
opportunity for clarification of the coercion test, as it squarely presents the intersection of student religious
speech and state compulsion.
116. One difference between Mergens and graduation invocations is that Mergens involves student
proselytizing, while invocations involve student prayer. The Court has indicated, however, that proselytiza-
tion creates a greater imposition on unwilling listeners. In Widmar v. Vincent, the Court refused to
distinguish "religious worship" (prayer) and "religious appeals to nonbelievers" (proselytization). 454 U.S.
263, 269 n.6, 271 n.9 (1981) (holding that this distinction is beyond "judicial competence to administer"
and "lacks a foundation in either the Constitution or in our cases").
The Court's most recent statements maintain that proselytizing speech calls for greater Establishment
Clause scrutiny. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983) ("The content of the prayer is not
of concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited
to proselytize or advance any one.., faith or belief,"); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603
n.52 (1989) (Marsh does not ensure constitutionality of "practices like proclaiming a National Day of
Prayer," for "[l]egislative prayer does not urge citizens to engage in religious practices, and on that basis
could well be distinguishable from an exhortation from government to the people that they engage in
religious conduct."); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 439 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("New
York's prayer is of a character that does not involve any element of proselytizing.").
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"initiate and organize additional student clubs." '117 Schools also could indicate
that official recognition of a club was not an endorsement of the club's
views.118
The first two factors are the most important and are easily translated into
the graduation context. Under an equal access invocation plan, no school
officials would be involved in either selecting speakers or monitoring the
content of the invocations. Students would be solely responsible for selecting
speakers; the speakers themselves would have sole control over content.'19
The students' freedom from school interference is the most crucial part of the
plan, for it ensures that the invocations are literally student speech. If a school
selects speakers, provides composition guidelines, or edits the speakers' text,
the invocations become school speech, making endorsement of the invocations
unavoidable.
The third and fourth factors cited by the Mergens plurality relate to stu-
dents' perceptions of the "openness" of the open forum. Here, the special nature
of the graduation forum becomes relevant. In Mergens, proselytization was only
one of potentially many types of speech to which students would be exposed
throughout the school year. Graduation invocations and benedictions, however,
provide opportunities for only two students to speak. Because the speech
opportunities are limited, the graduation ceremony itself does not reflect a
diversity of views. There is a chance that students might believe that the school
prefers the particular views expressed at their graduation.
An invocation plan, however, can be structured to provide both the appear-
ance and effect of giving equal access to all views. The school can make clear
that students selected to give invocations may express any sentiments they
wish. 20 Students could govern the process of selecting speakers. Since only
two students and two views will be given "access" at graduation, the selection
process must be "equal." But instead of electing speakers, speakers could be
chosen at random. This method of selection would be more consistent with the
plan's primary aim of providing equal access for all views. Selecting speakers
by majority vote might tend to promote a representation of views held by the
majority of students."'
117. 110 S. Ct. at 2372-73.
118. Id. at 2372.
119. This was the case in Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 822 F.2d 1406, 1407 (6th Cir.1987),
and Jager v. Douglas County School District, 862 F.2d 824, 827 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090
(1989).
120. In order to make clear that prayer is not the preferred form of speech, the school might use the
more neutral terms "opening" and "closing" rather than "invocation" and "benediction." See Arnold H.
Loewy, School Prayer, Neutrality, and the Open Forum: Why We Don't Need a Constitutional Amendment,
61 N.C. L. REV. 141, 155 (1982) (suggesting that under"open forum" concept, student prayer before school
assemblies should be permissible when students are chosen at random and neutral term "philosophical
recitation" rather than "prayer" is used).
121. Even when students are chosen at random, there is of course a greater possibility that adherents
of majority views will be selected. But a prevalence of one religious denomination or even of religious belief
in general within a school should not be enough, by itself, to invalidate an equal access plan. Many religious
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In addition to refraining from any actions relating to the selection of
speakers and composition of invocations, schools can take affirmative steps to
avoid the appearance of endorsement. Schools can add an explanatory statement
or disclaimer in the graduation program confirming that the invocations are
purely student speech.'22 More importantly, the school could inform students
of the policy regarding invocations well before graduation. This would both
facilitate student participation and help preclude any message of endorsement.
If students are aware that all views have a fair opportunity of receiving expres-
sion at graduation, they will understand the content of the invocation and
benediction in terms of the random selection process. Students might regret that
a particular view was not expressed, but they would understand this to be the
result of chance, not official preference.123
IV. CONCLUSION
Recent decisions have addressed the issue of graduation prayer solely in
terms of the content of the invocations. As these cases demonstrate, an exami-
nation of content inevitably involves judicial prayer composition. The clearest
command of the Establishment Clause prohibits government (including judges)
from composing prayers.
The Establishment Clause is implicated only if the challenged religious
students might feel uncomfortable offering religious invocations at graduation. As Justice Brennan has
convincingly argued, "It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and
controversies into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the devout believer who fears the secularization
of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with and dependent upon the government." School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
811-12 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); White, supra note 74, at 499 n. 101. For this reason, a court should
not assume, as the Jager court did, that all religious adherents will give religious invocations. Jager, 862
F2d at 831 (concluding that "the likely result of the equal access plan will be the continuation of Protestant
Christian invocations" because "Protestant Christianity is the majority religious preference").
In Stein, students at one school selected ministers to give invocations. See Stein v. Plainwell Communi-
ty Schs., 822 F.2d 1406, 1407 (6th Cir. 1987). In addition to the questions raised by the inclusion of outside,
especially clerical, speakers, this presents the same majority-rule difficulty. Different problems would be
raised if students self-consciously attempted to provide diversity by selecting representatives of different
religious and nonreligious groups. Aside from the difficulties involved in identifying various discrete beliefs
and the persons holding them, this procedure would achieve its end only if these speakers gave invocations
that expressed their particular beliefs. Many students, however, might not wish to offer invocations reflecting
their beliefs at graduation.
122. In Mergens, the plurality noted, perhaps as an example, the practice of the university in Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). The plurality observed that the university's student handbook stated that
the school's name "will not be identified with the aims, policies, or opinions of any student organization
or its members." Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2372 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n.14); see also County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 619 (1989) (Blackmun, J.) ("'explanatory plaque' may confirm that
in particular contexts the government's association with a religious symbol does not represent the govern-
ment's sponsorship of religious beliefs." (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 707 (1984) (Brennan,
J., dissenting))).
123. See Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2373 (holding that students' knowledge oftheir opportunity to initiate
clubs "counteract[s]" any perception of endorsement of religion); see also Loewy, supra note 120, at 155
(students' awareness of school's open forum policy removes likelihood of perceived school endorsement
of student speech).
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activity carries the imprimatur of the state. This principle presupposes an
inquiry into the state's relation to the speech. Courts have been compelled to
focus on the content of invocations because they have largely dispensed with
this inquiry into endorsement. Mergens, however, confirms its importance.
Taken together, Mergens and these recent invocation cases reveal, in sharply
different ways, that fidelity to Engel v. Vitale'2 lies not in prohibiting, but
in permitting, prayer at graduation.
124. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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